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## **FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT: SUSTAINABLE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

Chris Abbott and Sophie Marsden

### **1) INTRODUCTION**

The Middle East and North Africa is a region of great diversity. It encompasses Arab and many other ethnic populations, theocratic and secular states, democracies and authoritarian regimes. A region of immense wealth and crippling poverty; it is blessed (some might say cursed) with vast resources, not least oil, but has not always proved able to manage them for the benefit of ordinary people. While it is often viewed from the outside as a source of terrorism and conflict, the regional perception is one of foreign occupation and other external interference.

This report is based on the outcomes of a consultation that Oxford Research Group (ORG) and the Institute for Peace Studies (IPS) held in Egypt in October 2008. Bringing together security experts, academics, government officials and civil society leaders from across the Middle East and North Africa, the two-day meeting explored the implications of the sustainable security framework for the region (see Appendix I for a list of participants). All the participants attended in a personal capacity and this report does not necessarily represent a consensus view or the view of any individual participant, organisation or government. The Ford Foundation-funded consultation was the second in a series of six regional meetings to be held over 2008-09 as part of ORG's *Moving Towards Sustainable Security* programme.

In many ways, the Middle East and North Africa defies clear definition, and is not a label readily recognised within the region. It cannot be described as the Muslim world, for that would include Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and other countries outside the region with large Muslim populations. Nor can it rightly be described as the Arab world, for that would exclude Iran, Turkey, Israel and other non-Arab countries, as well as the Berber, Assyrian, Kurdish, black African and other populations found throughout the region. But for the purposes of this report, the Middle East and North Africa is taken in a broad sense: from Morocco in the west and Afghanistan in the east, to Turkey in the north and Yemen in the south. There will, however, be clear overlap with related countries that, rightly or wrongly, have been included in other consultations, such as some of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia.

As each of the regional consultations take place, a set of coherent proposals will emerge that can be fed directly into the policy-making processes in Europe and the United States, as well as inform the development of regional security policies that can be promoted by partner organisations around the world.

### **2) SUSTAINABLE SECURITY**

As in much of the world, the current security discourse in the Middle East and North Africa is dominated by what might be called the 'control paradigm': an approach based on the premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force or balance of power politics and containment, thus maintaining the status quo. The most obvious global example of this approach has been the so-called 'war on terror', which essentially aims to 'keep the lid' on terrorism and insecurity, without addressing the root causes (an approach that has negatively impacted on the region). Such approaches to national, regional and international security are deeply flawed – particularly if not complemented by diplomatic efforts – and

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are distracting the world's politicians from developing realistic and sustainable solutions to the non-traditional threats facing the world.

In contrast, this report explores an alternative approach, that of 'sustainable security'. The central premise of sustainable security is that you cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, but must work to resolve the causes. In other words, 'fighting the symptoms' will not work, you must instead 'cure the disease'. Such a framework must be based on **an integrated analysis of security threats and a preventative approach to responses.**

Sustainable security focuses on the interconnected, long-term drivers of insecurity, including:

- **Climate change:** Loss of infrastructure, resource scarcity and the mass displacement of peoples, leading to civil unrest, intercommunal violence and international instability.
- **Competition over resources:** Competition for increasingly scarce resources – including food, water and energy – especially from unstable parts of the world.
- **Marginalisation of the majority world:** Increasing socio-economic divisions and the political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the vast majority of the world's population.
- **Global militarisation:** The increased use of military force as a security measure and the further spread of military technologies (including CBRN weapons).

All of these trends are present in the security dynamic in the Middle East and North Africa, as demonstrated in the next section of this report. The sustainable security analysis makes a distinction between these trends and other security threats, which might instead be considered symptoms of the underlying causes and tend to be more localised and immediate (for example terrorism or organised crime). It promotes a comprehensive, systemic approach, taking into account the interaction of different trends which are generally analysed in isolation by others. It also places particular attention on how the current behaviour of international actors and western governments is contributing to, rather than reducing, insecurity.

Sustainable security goes beyond analysis of threats to the development of a framework for new security policies. It takes global justice and equity as the key requirements of any sustainable response, together with progress towards reform of the global systems of trade, aid and debt relief; a rapid move away from carbon-based economies; bold, visible and substantial steps towards nuclear disarmament (and the control of biological and chemical weapons); and a shift in defence spending to focus on the non-military elements of security. This takes into account the underlying structural problems in national and international systems, and the institutional changes that are needed to develop and implement effective solutions. It also links long-term global drivers to the immediate security pre-occupations of ordinary people at a local level (such as corruption or violent crime).

By aiming to cooperatively resolve the root causes of threats using the most effective means available, sustainable security is inherently preventative in that it addresses the likely causes of conflict and instability well before the ill-effects are felt. In doing so, it incorporates and builds upon many elements of previous important attempts to reframe the way we think about security, including:

- **Common security:** Security is dependent on cooperation, demilitarisation and mutual trust.
- **Comprehensive security:** Security must go beyond military defence, and take into account the other social, environmental and economic issues that are vital to national stability.
- **Human security:** A people-centred, rather than state-centred, view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability.
- **Just security:** Security is dependent on international institutions and the rule of law.
- **Non-traditional security:** Governments must move beyond defining security in terms of relationships among nation states and address newly developing trends and transnational security threats.

### 3) DRIVERS OF INSECURITY

While there are many immediate security concerns in the region, there are perhaps three principal drivers of insecurity over the medium- to long-term:

- **Conflict and occupation**
- **Resource management**
- **Marginalisation and social exclusion**

#### a) Conflict and occupation

The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the principal drivers of insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa. From the struggle for Jewish statehood in the 1940s to the wars of 1967 and 1973, Israel's existence has at times been perilous and consequently security dominates the domestic political agenda above all other issues. Today, though, Israel is seen by many of its neighbours as the most militarily aggressive country in the region. Its ongoing occupation of Palestinian territory and its attacks on Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008 did little or nothing to improve Israeli security but led to high numbers of civilian casualties and serious accusations of war crimes have been made that are now under investigation.

Israel sees itself as isolated, surrounded by potential enemies, both state and non-state, which it believes pose an existential threat. At the same time, though, the Arab world sees that Israel benefits from the political and financial support of the United States government and has the best equipped and trained military forces in the region, backed up by the ultimate weapon of last resort in its controversial nuclear arsenal. While at times it does display a willingness to use diplomacy and negotiation (such as with Egypt, Jordan and, most recently, Syria), the history of the conflict and the level of mistrust in the region means diplomacy is viewed by many Israelis as a tool of the naive. Instead, Israel's approach to security is built on the principle of deterrence and all too often it allows relations with other countries to become militarised – believing that military power is the only language that gets heard in a “tough neighbourhood”.

The move from a Bush to an Obama administration in the United States at the same time as a political move to the right in Israel could lead to tensions between the two governments and potentially isolate the country even further. This may, however, eventually have the positive effect of encouraging Israel to take seriously the offer set out in the Arab Peace Initiative first proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and endorsed by both the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In short, this initiative offers Israel comprehensive peace agreements and the normalisation of relations with Arab countries in exchange for a withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, recognition of an independent Palestinian state (with East Jerusalem as its capital) and a just solution for Palestinian refugees. It probably represents one of the best opportunities for Arab-Israeli peace today.

Conflict in the region is not just limited to Israel and its Arab neighbours – world powers have projected their interests into the region through the threat or use of force. Recent years have seen the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies and open discussion of airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and other infrastructure by either the United States or Israel. The war in Iraq has been particularly devastating for the region. At least 100,000 Iraqi civilians – but likely many more – have been killed since the March 2003 invasion (together with over 4,500 members of the coalition forces). Even greater numbers have been injured or displaced by the violence the invasion unleashed on the civilian population. The UNHCR estimates that 4.7 million Iraqis have been forced to leave their homes, with 2 million of these having left Iraq for neighbouring countries, predominantly Syria and Jordan, creating a desperate humanitarian situation and placing considerable strain on the social services of the host countries. This adds to the already significant numbers of refugees displaced by

conflicts in the region, including the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1979-89 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan.

While there has been limited intraregional state warfare of this nature in the last fifteen years or so, many countries are facing internal conflicts. The bulk of these are insurgencies by radical Islamist movements – such as in Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan – or separatist movements, most notably the Kurdish people of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria and the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara. However, it is the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with the instability in Saudi Arabia, which attract the most international attention, as they threaten western political and economic interests. In addition to insurgencies and separatist movements, many countries also suffer from high levels of civil unrest, which the authorities often try to suppress and crack down on when it materialises on the streets.

#### b) Resource management

Nearly two-thirds of all proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East and eight of the fourteen countries in OPEC are from the Middle East and North Africa. The largest proven reserves in the world are all found in the region – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE. Saudi Arabia alone produces over ten million barrels a day, making it the single largest producer of oil in the world. The Middle East also has 40% of all proven natural gas reserves, with Iran and Qatar holding the largest deposits in the region (the second and third largest deposits in the world). These resources generate huge wealth, but are all too often controlled by ruling families and local elites with relatively little benefit to the poorer sections of society.

The decline of production in some of the oil producing countries or the need to extract harder to reach and less profitable deposits (both features of peak oil) will create a widening gap between supply and demand, with unpredictable political and economic consequences. This is happening at a time when domestic demand is increasing in many Middle East and North African countries due to economic development and population growth. As such, forward-thinking governments are looking to diversify their economies and energy systems away from oil. Some of these developments could be positive – such as the proposed DESERTEC solar and wind power generation scheme – some, such as Iran's nuclear programme, create security concerns of their own.

Oil is not the only problematic resource for the region; two other key resources, water and food, are also likely to drive insecurity. Water shortages already create tensions in some parts of the region where several countries rely on the same water source – for example, the Nile River in North Africa and the River Jordan in the Middle East. Access to water has dramatically deteriorated as a result of water-intensive agriculture in the Gulf countries, the tourism industry around the Mediterranean and ambitious national projects (such as the construction of dams by Turkey). The resulting scarcity impacts unequally on the rich and the poor, on the Israeli settlers and the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, or on tourists and the local population. As water prices rise, priority will be given to those who can afford to pay more, leaving marginalised communities at even greater risk.

This situation is likely to deteriorate further as climate change causes higher temperatures and reduced precipitation, leading to a higher frequency and severity of droughts. The greater risk of flooding and increased evaporation could also affect strategic water storage infrastructure (such as Lake Nasser in Egypt) and the aquifer systems that supply Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. However, as well as being a source of insecurity, addressing water management problems could be a potential tool for peacebuilding, as it provides opportunities for intranational and international dialogue and cooperation on a non-conflict related issue, which can help build on interdependencies and reduce distrust and suspicion.

Food shortages are a further concern in a number of countries in the region and this situation will deteriorate over the coming decades as a result of climate change significantly reducing agricultural output at the same time as the region experiences dramatic population growth. Much of the region is already heavily dependent on food imports, which leaves it vulnerable to fluctuations in the global commodity markets. Recent years have seen violent riots in Morocco (September 2007), Yemen (March 2008) and Egypt (April 2008), primarily relating to the rising cost of wheat and the knock on effect on bread prices, together with the poor economic situation in general. The UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia all had to use their considerable oil wealth to raise public sector salaries or increase subsidies on basic food products, and Iran, Syria and Jordan have struggled with the effects of rising inflation. As always it is the poorest in these societies that have been hit hardest and their resentment often finds a target in the perceived corruption of governments.

### c) Marginalisation and social exclusion

The Middle East and North Africa is a tapestry of societal norms, traditions and customs. Such social practices often conflict with western attitudes towards, for example, democracy, gender equality and freedom of speech. Whilst there have been many positive steps made toward greater equality and improving human rights across the region, there remains a great disparity between the privileged and the less-privileged in terms of wealth, power and social status, resulting in the social, political and economic marginalisation of significant sections of the population. This is clearly detrimental not only to the individual or group concerned, but also to the development and prosperity of the region as a whole.

An increasing global divide between the rich and the poor, interacting with the fact that wealth and power continues to reside with a limited number of individuals within the region, has set in motion an erosion of the middle classes, with the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. This both stems from, and results in, a rise in the percentage of the population that is poorly educated or unemployed. War and conflict has also interrupted the education of many young people in the region. With limited economic opportunities and an increase in political disenfranchisement stemming from authoritarian political leaders who are insufficiently responsive to their needs, the next generation has become disaffected and apathetic towards mainstream domestic politics. This may leave young people more susceptible to radicalisation from fundamentalist groups that offer radical philosophies that explain their current predicament and propose violent actions that make sense from within an environment of marginalisation. Such militancy often offers a viable vehicle of protest and resistance when all other political routes seem closed.

This corruption in the political and social spheres partly stems from a lack of civil society groups that are able to effectively engage those in power in public dialogue and hold them responsible for their actions. The Iranian government recently placed strict restrictions on NGOs working within the country, specifically women's groups and human rights activists. Bahrain has threatened to prosecute any human rights groups or activists that actively engage in discussion of social, political or economic conditions in Bahrain with international organisations or other governments without permission. In Israel, a country with a traditionally strong state and weak civil society, the authorities now find themselves under pressure from a more vocal and powerful civil society. They have responded by significantly reducing funding to universities that were the main source of criticism. As in the rest of the world, the role of civil society within the Middle East and North Africa is crucial in ensuring that the balance between political governance and civil liberties is upheld and that human rights are prioritised and defended.

The subjugation of women in the region is a contentious issue for local and international human rights groups. The status of women, their social standing and their participation in civil society is more often than not based on the social norms of male-dominated societies rather than on religious teachings. As such, their status varies widely across the region and it is important to note that women's rights found in

one society may be different to those found in another. However, many women in the region still invariably bear the brunt of honour expectations, are the victims of domestic violence or suffer from unequal status in the judicial system. The most obvious examples of this are the practises of male guardianship and gender segregation in Saudi Arabia, which continues to treat adult women as legal minors and clearly restricts the autonomy and authority a woman has over her own life and further restricts the part they play in wider Saudi society. Given that women represent half the population, such an example of female suppression is not only an abuse of basic human rights, but also clearly limits the social, political and economic potential of the country. In many other countries in the region, the social and familial pressures that control women are far more subtle, but still as damaging.

#### 4) BLOCKAGES TO CHANGE

Many of the drivers outlined above can be addressed and mechanisms put in place to resolve the long-term causes of insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa. However, there are three major, though not insurmountable, blockages to achieving such a change:

- **The Israeli-Palestinian conflict**
- **Al-Qaida and other fundamentalist movements**
- **External interference**

The shadow of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hangs over the region. But if it were resolved today, peace and stability would not spring up across the region tomorrow. As outlined above, there are many other drivers of insecurity that would still need addressing. However, the conflict is so deep-seated that it blocks progress on many other important security issues. It is a scar on the Arab and Muslim psyche that is personally felt by many ordinary people across the Middle East and further afield. The continued presence of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land and the appalling human rights situation for most Palestinians due to military action and the continuing blockade of Gaza increases support for Hamas and other Islamist movements and maintains Israel's status as a regional, if not global, pariah state.

Israelis demand security, while Palestinians demand an independent and viable state of their own – the two are, of course, mutually dependent on each other. However, Israel's reliance on the military elements of security above all other mechanisms leads to disproportionate levels of civilian deaths and injuries amongst the Palestinian population, together with the destruction of property and infrastructure. Furthermore, international attempts to isolate Hamas are ignoring the legitimate political aspirations of those who handed the movement a clear mandate in the January 2006 elections. For its part, the continued refusal by Hamas to officially recognise the State of Israel and its rocket attacks on the civilian population of Israel are deeply counter-productive and only provoke further military responses. The cycle needs to be broken.

Unfortunately, all too often many of the issues discussed in this report find their expression in violence or extremism. In some cases, religious fundamentalism and societal tradition become intertwined, and many of the social problems that the region experiences have little direct connection to Islam. However, it cannot be denied that extreme forms of religious fundamentalism threaten progress and development in the region (despite notable efforts in Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and elsewhere to promote modern interpretations of Islamic teachings). At the political level, Islamism offers an alternative to western notions of market-led democracy and represents a response to perceived western Islamophobia and Arabophobia. At the violent end of the spectrum, this frustration can be manifested in local groups, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban, or international movements, such as al-Qaida (together with its local affiliates, including AQIM in Algeria, GICM in Morocco and LIFG in Libya).

However, there are three important points about such violent groups that are often not well understood outside the region. The first is that to label all paramilitary organisations from the Middle East and North Africa as "Islamic" is as misleading as labelling all such European organisations as "Christian" would be



– it fails to recognise the different historical, political and social background of these groups, and ignores the fact that many of them have primarily nationalistic, not religious, aims. The second is that some of these groups are not solely militant organisations, but also provide important social services, including schools and hospitals, which enables them to garner the support of the wider population. The third is that the region is not simply a source of terrorism, but rather is the greatest victim of terrorism – with Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Yemen, Algeria, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Iran and Egypt all suffering terrorist attacks during 2007-09.

For many in Washington, London and elsewhere, the al-Qaida movement, in particular, has been dismissed as a violent ideology promoting nothing but an irrational hatred of the west. However, the broad political aims of the movement can be clearly identified as: the expulsion of foreign troops from the Middle East; the removal of the House of Saud and other elitist and pro-western regimes across the region; the destruction of Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state; and support for insurgencies across the Muslim world. While the tactics and rhetoric used are abhorrent, the political goals of such movements are, at times, widely supported and can no longer be simply dismissed. Furthermore, attempts to sway them away from violence must continue to move beyond the confrontational policies pursued during the failed ‘war on terror’.

External interference in the region is not just limited to recent history or to the ‘war on terror’, military occupation and the labelling of an ‘axis of evil’, but involves wider, though less obvious, political and economic manipulation. Today the region attracts the interest of external powers for two main geopolitical reasons, both of which have already been mentioned. The first is oil, the most strategically important of all resources. The second is the presence of groups who oppose western foreign policy and offer alternative political and social models rooted in various interpretations of Islam. Manifested in seemingly hostile governments, such as Iran, or Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, this alternative thinking represents a potential threat to the vested interests of local and global elites. This often leads western governments to provide political and economic support for repressive regimes seen as allies, who in turn use this support to remain in power. Such actions block regional development and feed the belief that the west is waging a war against Islam.

## 5) RECOMMENDATIONS

The blockages to change identified above must be urgently addressed in order to allow the development of mechanisms that will ensure the drivers outlined in section 3 do not develop into sources of insecurity and conflict over the medium- to long-term. Specific initiatives in four key areas include:

- 1) **Political and socio-economic reform:** The peoples of many parts of the Middle East and North Africa are calling out for political, economic and social reform, but no clear road map exists nor is there a good understanding of what participatory democracy in the region might look like if developed from within rather than imposed from without. Therefore, a pan-regional, civil society-led, independent panel of experts, elder statesmen and religious scholars should be constituted to examine these issues, including reform of education systems, the role of civil society, the defence of human rights and the promotion of equal status for women. This can then be projected through the Arab Reform Initiative and other forums that link regional and international actors and support indigenous calls for reform.
- 2) **Middle East peace:** Perhaps the best chance for Arab-Israeli peace is the Arab Peace Initiative. For this to succeed a sustained civil society effort will be needed to educate the Israeli public on the content and nature of the initiative and the US will need to persuade the Israeli government to take it seriously. President Obama must, therefore, continue to focus on pushing the Middle East peace process forward, and not allow it to drop down the agenda until the final months of his administration like so many of his predecessors. A concerted effort must be made within Palestinian

society to encourage the cessation of militant attacks on Israel and the Arab League should continue to publicly voice its support for the initiative. At the same time, Israel must finally address the settlement and refugee issues.

- 3) **Regional integration:** The Arab League is one of the most important multilateral institutions in the region but will need greater engagement with Turkey, Iran and Israel if it is to encourage regional integration and meaningful cooperation and dialogue on security issues. In the first instance, such engagement might be based on mitigating and adapting to climate-induced resource scarcity, with a particular focus on developing water management agreements. This process could act as a precursor to the development of a new regional institution that includes all of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa and can operate alongside other organisations such as the Arab League.
- 4) **International institutions:** International institutions must be reformed to become more inclusive, giving the Middle East and North Africa a seat at the tables of global governance. The region clearly needs permanent representation in the UN Security Council, but also in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the other economic and political intergovernmental organisations that impact on the Middle East and North Africa. This will allow the region a certain degree of influence in the decisions that affect it and also somewhat reduce the perception, if not the reality, of unwanted and potentially damaging external interference.

Over the next 5-10 years, a radical shift towards sustainable approaches to security will be hugely important. If there is no change in thinking, security policies will continue to be based on the mistaken assumption that the status quo can be maintained: an elite minority can maintain its position, environmental problems can be marginalised, and the lid can be kept on dissent and insecurity. Alternatively, a change in thinking could lead to an era of substantial progress in developing a more socially just and environmentally sustainable regional order for the Middle East and North Africa.



## APPENDIX I) LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The following experts participated in the ORG-IPS Regional Sustainable Security Consultation for the Middle East and North Africa, held at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in Alexandria, Egypt, 12-14 October 2008. All the participants attended in a personal capacity and this report does not necessarily represent a consensus view or the view of any individual participant, organisation or government.

### REGIONAL PARTICIPANTS

- **Professor Samia El Fessi (Tunisia)**, Professor of Political Science at the Tunisia High Institute of Leaders, member of the editing board of the *Journal of International Studies* and the Advisory Committee of the Arab Thought Foundation and President of the African Development Council.
- **General Ahmed Abdel Halim (Egypt)**, member of Shura Council (Upper House of the Egyptian Parliament), Upper Council for Policies, the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Arab, Foreign and National Security Affairs of the Shura Council.
- **Professor Abdullah El Harsi (Morocco)**, Professor of Public Law at the University Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah, Secretary-General of the Interdisciplinary Moroccan Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and Director of the Centre for Research and Studies on Local Communities.
- **Professor Tamar Hermann (Israel)**, Dean of Academic Studies at the Open University of Israel, Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute and former Director of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University.
- **Semih Dündar İdiz (Turkey)**, Journalist for the *Daily Milliyet* and *Turkish Daily News* and former Diplomatic Editor for CNN Turk and journalist for the Economic Press Agency, Anatolian News Agency, *Cumhuriyet Daily*, *Turkish Daily News*, NTV News, *Star Daily* and *Aksam Daily*.
- **Professor Farhang Jahanpour (Iran)**, former Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Languages at the University of Isfahan, Senior Fulbright Research Scholar at Harvard University and Editor for the Middle East and North Africa at the BBC Monitoring Service.
- **Ambassador Hani Mulki (Jordan)**, Jordanian Ambassador to Egypt and former Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Water Resources, Minister of Trade and Industry, Adviser to King Abdullah of Jordan and Executive Director of the Islamic Academy of Sciences.
- **Professor Hassan Nafaa (Egypt)**, Professor and Head of the Political Science Department at Cairo University and has previously taught at the Egyptian Defense Academy, the Nasser Military Academy and the Diplomatic Institutes of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Oman.
- **Ambassador Adnan Omran (Syria)**, Secretary General of the Arab Parliament and former Minister of Information, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, First Secretary of the Syrian Embassy in Moscow and Ambassador of Syria to the United Kingdom and Sweden.
- **Professor Fatinah Shaker (Saudi Arabia)**, former Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology at King Abdul-Aziz University, founder and Editor of *Sayidaty* and the first Saudi woman to work in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
- **Dr. Hamed Shehab (Iraq)**, member of the Department of International Studies and former Associate Dean of Evening Studies, Head of International Studies and Visiting Professor in the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University.
- **Mohammad Haider Wahidi (Afghanistan)**, Deputy Managing Director of Afghanaid in Afghanistan, elected member of the Steering Committee of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) and former Lecturer in the English Department of Kabul University.

### OBSERVER

- **Professor Amitav Acharya (UK)**, Professor of International Affairs at the American University in Washington D.C. and former Professor of Global Governance and Director of the Centre for Governance & International Affairs at the University of Bristol.

## FACILITATORS

- **Chris Abbott (UK)**, Deputy Director of Oxford Research Group, Director of ORG's *Moving Towards Sustainable Security* programme and lead author of *Beyond Terror: The Truth About the Real Threats to Our World* (Random House, 2007).
- **Amer Fadoua (Egypt)**, Senior Specialist in the Institute for Peace Studies who has received training in conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation and attended the Fletcher School of Tufts University Summer Institute for Advanced Study of Non-violent Conflict.
- **Professor Azza El Kholy (Egypt)**, Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace Studies, Professor of American Literature at the University of Alexandria and Advisor for Special Projects in the Director's Office of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina.
- **Ambassador Aly Maher El Sayed (Egypt)**, Director of the Institute for Peace Studies and former Ambassador of Egypt to Tunisia and France, Representative of Egypt to the Arab League and Secretary General of the Arab Thought Foundation.
- **Dr. John Sloboda (UK)**, Executive Director of Oxford Research Group, Honorary Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London and co-founder of Iraq Body Count.

## RAPPORTUER

- **Sophie Marsden (UK)**, Intern and research assistant at Oxford Research Group.